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Introduction
The development of the Internet opens up a mass of opportunities for cooperative computation, where the answer depends on the private inputs of separate users. The problem is trivial if the context allows the conduct of these computations by a trusted party, who computes the required function on these inputs and gives back the output to each party; however, it is difficult to find such a trusted party in the real world. If the context disallows this then the techniques of Secure Multi-party Computation become very relevant.
Secure multi-party computation was first introduced by Yao in 1982, namely, well-known millionaires' problem [1] , and in 1987 Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson design a generic secure multiparty computation protocol [2] . In the past 30 years, there were large parts of the works focusing on solving arbitrary function, viz., generic secure multi-party computation, which enriched the theory to the most extreme. However, these solutions are many a time practically infeasible, motivated from this, many cryptographists in international and internal were initiated to find feasible solution to specific problems. Some examples are privacy preserving set operations [3] , privacy preserving data mining [4] , privacy preserving biding and auction [5] , one of many such areas is privacy preserving computational geometry [6] .
Secure convex hull two-party computation problem is one of privacy preserving computational geometry problems, it can be described briefly as follow: two parties have two sets of points on the same plane separately, they both want to compute convex hull about all known points on the certain plane by interaction way, but any one party wouldn't like to leak any information about his own point set to the other party (except information implied by the result). Wang et. al first construct two protocols based on Gift wrapping method and Quick method separately to solve this problem [7] , but there are some error in his second protocol, we point out his errors and propose two improved protocols. In addition, we analyze and compare security, computational complexity and communicational complexity about these two protocols.
This paper organized as follows: In section 2, we cover some necessary preliminaries. Section 3 presents two improved convex hull protocols, followed by section 4 and section 5, where security and complexity of protocols are given.
Preliminary

Security in Semi-honest Model
In general, according to adversary ability secure multi-party computation model can be divided into two kinds: semi-honest model and malicious model. Loosely speaking, a semihonest party is one who follows the protocol properly; except that it keeps a record of all its Journal of Convergence Information Technology Volume 5, Number 3, May 2010 intermediate computations and might try to derive the other parties' private inputs from the record, but a malicious party can arbitrarily deviate from protocol. Goldreich [8] proves that, if there is a protocol is secure in semi-honest model, then we can construct a protocol which is secure in malicious model by introducing macros that force each party to either behave in a semi-honest manner or be detected. Our work focuses on constructing secure convex hull two-party computation protocol in semi-honest model, the security in semi-honest model requires:
 Privacy: Nothing is learned from the protocol other than the output after computation;  Correctness: The parties' output is distributed according to the prescribed functionality.
Yao's Millionaire Protocol
As a sub-protocol of secure convex hull two-party computation protocol, Yao's millionaire protocol has huge effect on main-protocol's security, computational complexity and communicational complexity. Yao's millionaire problem can be described: Two millionaires, Alice and Bob, whose wealth is x and y millions respectively, both want to know who is richer, but neither wants to disclose his or her own wealth information to the other party other than the result.
None of the early solutions to Yao's Millionaire problem [1] is efficient, their computational complexity of comparing x and y is exponential in l, where l is the length of input number and their communication complexity is exponential in the length of the numbers involved. In 1999, Cachin propose a solution [5] based on the hiding φ − assumption, the communication complexity of Cachin's scheme is O(l).
Secure Convex Hull Two-party Problem
Two parties have two sets of points on the same plane separately, assuming that Alice inputs private point set
Through the secure convex hull protocol, Alice and Bob both get the points on the edge of Convex Hull for all points they known, but none of the parties obtains any information about the other parties' point set other than the output [9] . 
Notations
The set of Alice's (Bob's) points strictly right of the vector xy  .
Secure Convex Hull Protocols
Wang's second protocol [7] based on Quick method doesn't consider special case ( . = . ) ( . = . ) a x b x a y b y ∧ in step 2, namely, the case that the point a and the point b are the same point. In that case, the vector ab  is meaningless, and the point set ( ) S ab  is also meaningless. Similarly, the point b and the point c are the same point, the point c and the point d are the same point, the point d and the point a are the same point, and all meaningless cases are displayed in figure 1. However, the point a and the point c must be different points, the point b and the point d must be different points. Because if they are the same point, that means input points set P and Q both contain only one point separately, and they are the same point, which is meaningless. 
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Improved Protocol 2
Considering the idea of Divide and conquer method, Alice and Bob can compute convex hulls about their own point sets P and Q respectively in advance.  
Security Analysis
Privacy
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In our two improved protocols, the interaction between the two parties only happens in comparison of two length using Yao's Millionaire protocol, the remainder operations of the two protocols are done by each party locally, so the privacy of the two protocols only depend on privacy of Yao's Millionaire protocol. If we choose a secure Yao's Millionaire protocol as sub-protocol, then the privacy of our two protocols' privacy can be guaranteed.
Correctness
The improved protocol 1 is right, because the mistake in Wang's protocol is solved, and the figure 3 is result of running the program which based the improved protocol 1. The improved protocol 2 is based on the improved protocol 1, and all the points on the final convex hull are on the individual convex hulls, and no point is missed, so the improved protocol 2 is also right. 
Complexity Analysis
Generally, we only consider computational complexity and communication complexity of secure convex hull protocols, and the two improved secure convex hull protocols mentioned above can be divided into two parts logically. On the one hand, we assume that two parties trust each other, so they can together their points into one point set and any one of them computes convex hull for their joint point set, this part of protocol doesn't need to interact, so it only bring computational complexity; on the other hand, because the two participants in fact don't trust each other, they have to call Yao's Millionaire protocol as a sub-protocol, we have to consider both computational complexity and communication complexity of this part of protocol.
Assume that computational complexity and communicational complexity are ( ) O YJ and ( )
O YT
respectively when calling Yao's Millionaire protocol one time, and assume that the number of boundary points on the convex hull about n points on the same plane is h . Then, because these two improved protocols call Yao's Millionaire protocol h times, communication complexity of both protocols is ( ) hO YT , computational complexity of calling Millionaire protocol is ( ) hO YJ . Yao [11] has proved that any decision-tree algorithm for the two-dimensional case requires quadratic or higher-order tests, and that any algorithm using quadratic tests (which include all currently know algorithms) can not be done with lower complexity than ( ) log O n n . Yao's analysis applies to the hardest cases, where the number of points n is equal to h . In easier cases, where h n < , the bound of ( ) The table 1 displays computational complexity and communication complexity of these two improved protocols. Obviously, the communication complexity of two protocols is equal, while the computation complexity of improved protocol 2 is lower than the computation complexity of improved protocol 1 in general case ( m m ′  and n n ′  ), so the efficiency improved protocol 2 is higher.
Conclusion
In this paper, we point out some error in Wang's protocol, and propose two improved secure convex hull protocols. In addition, we analyze and compare security, computational complexity and communicational complexity about these two improved protocols.
In the future, we will try to find some higher efficient or approximate solutions [7] to the convex hulls problem in two-dimension plane and construct efficient protocols to solve convex hulls problem in three-dimension space.
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